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Abstract
Ageneral security proof of continuous variable (CV)measurement device independent (MDI)
quantumkey distribution (QKD) should not be automatically reduced to the analysis of one-mode
Gaussian attacks (in particular, independent entangling-cloner attacks). To stress this point, the
present work provides a very simple (almost trivial) argument, showing that there are an infinite
number of two-modeGaussian attacks that cannot be reduced to or simulated by one-modeGaussian
attacks. This result further confirms that the security analysis ofCV-MDI-QKDmust generally involve
a carefulminimization over two-mode attacks as originally performed in (Pirandola et al, 2015Nature
Photon. 9, 397–402; arXiv:1312.4104 (2013)).
1. Introduction
Measurement-device-independent quantumkey distributionMDI-QKD [1, 2] promises to be a remarkably
effective solution for the practical implementation of the next generation ofQKD infrastructures, inwhich
privacy should be granted over a quantumnetwork. InMDI-QKD the authorized users of the network, Alice and
Bob, exploit a swapping-like protocol where secret correlations are established by themeasurement of a third
untrusted party, the relay [1, 3–6]. This performs a Bellmeasurement but, in order to achieve security, it is not
required to pass a Bell test. By contrast, in full device independentQKD [7, 8], the privacy of the shared key
depends on passing a Bell test, which is still an operation performedwith very poor success rates [9–11]. The
power of theMDI approach relies indeed on its practicality: One can achieve high-rate side-channel-free
unconditionally secure network communication.
In recent years the study ofQKDprotocols [12] based on quantum continuous variables (CVs) [13] has
attracted increasingly attention because of several appealing properties of CV systems: Protocols use bright
coherent states, and exploit standard telecommunication technologies; in particular coherent detection
techniques, already developed for classical optical communication [14]. In addition, CV-QKD is interesting for
the relatively simple implementation of protocols at different frequencies [15, 16]. Finally, exploiting CVpoint-
to-point protocol with state-of-the-art classical reconciliation and error correction schemes [17–19] allowed the
implementationCV-QKD in laboratory over a distance of 80Km [20]. After this work, several other
experimental realizations have shown progress for integratedminiaturization [21] and implementation of long-
distance communication [22, 23]. The high rate performance of CV-QKD is not so far from the secret key
capacity of the lossy channel, also known as PLOBbound [24, 25], which is achievable by aCV-QKDprotocol
based on the reverse coherent information [26].
In 2013we proposed aCV-MDI-QKDprotocol, whichwe have also successfully tested in a proof-of-
principle experiment [3]. In particular, we proved that our scheme is capable of remarkably high key-rates per
use of the communication channel, over the length ofmetropolitan range distances. This performance is
sensibly higher than implementations based on discrete variables [27].We therefore believe that CV-QKDwill
play a crucial role in future implementation ofmetropolitan quantum cryptography. At this scale, in fact, both
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high density of untrusted nodes and high rates should be considered nonnegotiable properties, if wewant a
quantumnetwork able of competingwith present classical infrastructure.
In this workwe provide a further discussion on the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKDgiven in [3, 4].We
show, by simple arguments, that the security analysis restricted to one-modeGaussian (entangling-cloner)
attacks can only account for a subclass of all possible eavesdropping strategies. In particular we provide a
counterexample in order to explicitly prove that, if wemodel Eve’s attack assuming a restricted strategy, based
on independent entangling cloners, one cannot generate all the possible covariancematrices shared between
Alice and Bob.Our analysis confirms that a complete security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD cannot indeed avoid to
consider two-modeGaussian attacks, as originally done in [3, 4].
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2we present the protocol. Section 3 gives general
consideration about the security analysis,marking the difference between theoretical and experimental analyses.
Section 4provides a simple counter example to the (wrong) assumption that an attack by independent
entangling cloners would be complete. Finally, section 5 is for our conclusions.
2.Description of the protocol
We start with a brief description of the protocol [3]. At one side, Alice prepares amodeA in a coherent state añ∣
whose amplitudeα ismodulated by aGaussian distributionwith zeromean and large variance. At the other side,
Bob prepares hismodeB in another coherent state bñ∣ whose amplitudeβ ismodulated by the sameGaussian
distribution as Alice.ModesA andB are then sent to an intermediate relaywhere aCVBell detection is
performed. The classical outcomes are combined in a complex variable γ, which is communicated toAlice and
Bob via a public channel. As a result, knowledge of γ enables each party to infer the variable of the other party by
simple post-processing (see figure 1).
In general, the relay is assumed to be untrusted [1], i.e., operated by Eve, and also the linkswith the relay are
subject to eavesdropping. The protocol is assumed to be performedmany times, so that the honest parties collect
a large amount of classical data (we consider asymptotic security here). Using several tools, including de Finetti
arguments and the extremality of Gaussian states (see [3]formore details), one can reduce the security analysis
to considering a two-modeGaussian attack against the two linkswith the relay (performing a proper CVBell
detection). This type of attack can be constructed by suitably combining two canonical forms [28] into a
correlated-noise Gaussian environment. Themost relevant canonical forms are clearly the lossy channels.
In this scenario, the twomodesA andB aremixedwith two ancillarymodes,E1 andE2, by two beam splitters
with transmissivities τA and τB, respectively. These ancillarymodes belong to a reservoir of ancillas (E1, E2 plus
an extra set e) in a pureGaussian state. The reduced state sE E1 2 is a correlated thermal state with zeromean and
covariancematrix (CM) in the normal form
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where w w , 1A B are the variances of the thermal noise affecting each link, while g and ¢g are correlation
parameters, satisfying suitable physical constraints [29, 30]. After interaction, Eve’s ancillas are stored in a
quantummemory,measured at the end of the protocol (seefigure 2).
In order to deal with the joint attack, Alice and Bobmust retrieve the joint statistics of the variablesα,β, and
γ. For this purpose, they publicly compare a small part of their data and reconstruct the probability distribution
p(α,β, γ). The empirical values of the transmissivities τA and τB are accessible to the parties from the first-order
Figure 1.Basic protocol of CV-MDI-QKD.Alice and Bob encode information bymodulating the amplitude of coherent states, which
are sent to an untrusted intermediate station. The relay detects the incoming signals by performing a Bellmeasurement whose
outcome γ is broadcast to the parties. The knowledge of γ allows Alice and Bob to determine the amplitude of the other honest party,
by post-processing γ and the amplitudes (α andβ) in their hands.
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moments of p(α,β, γ). Knowing these values is essential in order to apply the correct post-processing and re-
scaling of the output data. Then, from the second-ordermoments of p(α,β, γ), Alice and Bob can extract the
CM gVab∣ that theywould share in an equivalent entanglement-based representation of the protocol [31] and
conditioned to the outcome γof the Bell detection at the relay (see [3]formore details). From this shared post-
relay CM, they can derive the secret-key rate of the protocol.
3.General considerations on the security analysis
It is important to note that, once the sharedCM gVab∣ is reconstructed byAlice and Bob, the secret-key rate can
be (numerically) computed nomatter what the actual eavesdropping strategywas. In fact, it is sufficient to
consider the purification of the state r gab∣ into an environment which is assumed to be fully controlled by Eve.
This is a pretty standardmethod inCV-QKD.
However, while this approach is valid for experimental demonstrations, it is generally not sufficient for
deriving analytic expressions of the key rateR, just because there are toomany free parameters in theCM.
Having simple analytic expressions is crucial in order to theoretically compare the performances of different
QKDprotocols. The next theoretical step is therefore the reduction of the free parameters to aminimum set
which is accessible to the parties and that allows us towrite a closed formula forR (or a lower-bound toR).
It is typical to derive a single quantifier of the noise, the so-called ‘excess noise’ ε, to be associated to the
observed values of the transmissivities τA and τB. Such a reduction is the non-trivial part of the theoretical
analysis since it requires aminimization of the ratewith respect to all degrees of freedomof Eve, once that the
triplet τA, τB, and ε has beenfixed. One important pre-requisite for such a reduction is the correctmodelling of
themost general attack that Eve can perform against the protocol. The entire ‘space of the attacks’must be
covered in this analysis. As pointed out in [3], CV-MDI-QKD requires the explicit consideration of all two-mode
Gaussian attacks, not just one-modeGaussian attacks, where = ¢ =g g 0. The latter class is in fact restricted and
can only lead to partial security proofs.
4. Simple counter-example to one-mode attacks
Herewe easily show that one-modeGaussian attacks represent a restricted class and, therefore, a security proof
of CV-MDI-QKDbased on these attacks can only be partial. Furthermore, since they form a restricted class, it
does notmake sense to claim their optimality.
For the sake of simplicity, consider the symmetric configuration [4], where Alice’s and Bob’s channels are
identical lossy channels, with the same transmissivity τ. Extension to asymmetric configurations is just amatter
of technicalities. After the action of the relay, the sharedCMofAlice and Bob is simply given by [3]
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Figure 2.Two-modeGaussian attack against CV-MDI-QKD. Figure adapted from [3]. The travelingmodesA andB interact with
ancillarymodes E1 andE2. The links to the relay are described by beam splitters with transmissivities tA B, and thermal noise wA B, .
Modes E1 andE2, together with the general set of additionalmodes e, describe the reservoir of ancillas E E e, ,1 2{ } controlled by the
eavesdropper.ModesE1 andE2 are quantum-correlated, while the global ancillary quantum state rE E e1, 2, is pure andGaussian. Eve’s
output ancillarymodes are stored in a quantummemory (QM), measured at the end of the protocol.
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In the previous CM, themodulation parameterμ is known toAlice and Bob, and also the transmissivity τ
which is derived by comparing the shared data and computing the first-ordermoments. By contrast, Alice and
Bob do not directly access the values of the thermal noise and the correlation parameters, since they are
combined in the x-parameters of equation (4)). The fact that the parametersωA,ωB, g and ¢g get scrambled in x
and ¢x has led some authors [32] to claim that one-mode attacks ( = ¢ =g g 0)with suitable values of the
thermal noise (ωA andωB) could simulate any two-mode attackwith arbitraryωA,ωB, g, and g
′. However, this is
not the case.
To understand this point, it is important to note that the components of theCM gVab∣ aremonotonic in x
and ¢x . As an example, the top-left component
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is increasing in x, so thatV11 isminimumwhen x isminimum. In the case of one-mode attacks ( = ¢ =g g 0), we
have x 1. It is therefore clear that any two-mode attack such that x<1 cannot be simulated by one-mode
attacks. Indeed there is an infinite number of such two-mode attacks. In fact, let us assume that Eve performs a
two-mode attackwithωA=ωB=ω and ¢ = -g g . In this case, we have w= ¢ = -x x g , and the condition
x<1 corresponds to imposing
w w- < -g1 1 , 62 ( )
inwhich case Eve’s ancillas are entangled [30].
Thus, for any value ofω, we can pick an entangled two-mode attackwhich cannot be simulated by one-mode
attacks. In otherwords, this entangled attack generates a sharedCM gVab∣ which does not belong to the set of
possible CMs associatedwith one-mode attacks. As depicted in figure 3, there is an infinite number of entangled
attacks which cannot be reduced to one-mode attacks.
Onemay attempt to enlarge the set of one-mode attacks by allowing for squeezed thermal noise, i.e., the use
of thermal states with asymmetric variances, wA
q for the q-quadrature and wA
p for the p-quadrature (and
similarly, wB
q and wB
p, for the other ancilla). In this case, equation (4) for one-mode attacks would become
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Figure 3.Correlation parameter g versus thermal noiseω. For any value ofω, two-mode attackswith w - g0 1 are performed
with separable ancillas, while two-mode attacks satisfying the stronger condition of equation (6) have entangled ancillas and cannot be
simulated by one-mode attacks. Values of g above w - 12 are prohibited by quantummechanics.
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However, since w w  1Aq Ap and w w  1Bq Bp , it is easy to check that realizing x<1would imply ¢ >x 1, and
vice versa. As a result, therewill always be components in the sharedCM gVab∣ whose values, for entangled
attacks, cannot be realized by assuming one-mode attacks.
5. Conclusion
Wehave considered the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD.Wehave explicitly shown that one-modeGaussian
(entangling-cloner) attacks represent a restricted class, which cannot generate all the possible sharedCMs for
Alice and Bob. This is true for any fixed value of the transmissivity τ for the two lossy channels (extension to
different transmissivities τA and τB is trivial). This very simple result confirms the necessity of explicitly studying
two-modeGaussian attacks in a general security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD, as originally considered in [3].
Note that the advantage of using attacks based on correlated ancillas has been also discussed for two-way
protocols [33, 34]. In that case the honest parties have to resort to additional strategies to re-establish security, as
described in [35].
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